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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
DANA L YD ELL SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 40947
(Minidoka 2004-2628)
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

Appellant Dana Smith submits the following in support of his Petition for Review. As
noted in the Court of Appeals' Opinion, there are substantial questions about the appellant's
competency to stand trial. However, counsel believes that his client is competent to determine
the objectives of representation. Accordingly, counsel submits this brief in compliance with
I.R.P.C. l.2(a) and l.14(a).

A.

Nature of the Case
Appellant Dana Smith filed a pro se motion for a new trial asserting that he should have

but did not have a competency evaluation or competency hearing and that he was not competent
during the trial proceedings. CR 6-7. The district court found the motion to be untimely,
declined to appoint counsel and denied the motion. CR 49-50.
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B.

Procedural History and Statement of Facts
1.

Prior proceedings

Mr. Smith was convicted of grand theft and his conviction and sentence were affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion on May 20, 2009. State v. Smith. No. 35216. 1
Mr. Smith then filed a petition for post-conviction relief prior to the completion of the direct
appeal. Id. Relief was denied and an appeal taken. Smith v. State, No. 40418. However,
appellate relief was denied by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion on November 14,
2011. Id.
On January 19, 2012, Mr. Smith filed a motion for new trial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence. CR 1. Smith's motion was based on his assertion that he was mentally
incompetent when he was tried for grand theft and that the district court had erred in failing to

sua sponte order a competency evaluation under LC.§ 18-211.
2.

Factual background for new trial motion

Mr. Smith was correct in his assertion that there was never a competency hearing, but was
mistaken in his assertion that he did not have a competency evaluation. The record from No.
35216 shows that Judge John Melanson ordered an LC.§ 18-211 competency evaluation. T (No.
35216) (April 10, 2007), pg. 52, ln. 1-9. Richard V. Smith, Ph.D. did the evaluation and wrote:
His ability to assist in his own defense presents a question, however. He can and
does ramble off rather inappropriately, both in terms of content and style
intermittently. In my view that likely seriously impairs his ability to work
systematically with his attorney in a sustained fashion. That is, there are brief
periods in which he appears to be very lucid and very much on target. However,

The Court has taken judicial notice of the files and records in State v. Dana Smith, No.
39704 (the motion for new trial appeal) and State v. Dana Smith, No. 35216 (the appeal from the
judgment and sentence).
1
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as indicated, intermittently he gets off target, is fairly irrational, bizarre, and
grandiose. In those regards, [i]t is my opinion that he cannot effectively and
systematically work with his defense attorney in a sustained fashion.
Smith Report, pg. 8 (in PSI). Dr. Smith went on to say:
In my opinion this examinee does not need to be rehospitalized. He can in all
likelihood be treated safely on an outpatient basis and should resume medications
to stabilize his mood. That being the case, once those medications would become
effective then he could in all likelihood proceed with the matters in court that he is
currently facing.

Id. Thus, Dr. Smith did not think Mr. Smith was competent to stand trial because he could not
assist his attorney in a rational manner, but that he could be competent to do so once he was
stabilized on his medications.
Dr. Smith's report was dated on May 2, 2007. On June 4, 2007, Mr. Smith's attorney,
Dennis Byington, told the Court, when Mr. Smith was not present, that Mr. Smith "had been
found to be not competent in aiding in his own defense to a certain degree." T (No. 35216) (June
4, 2007) pg. 69, In. 12 - pg. 70, In. 7. He went on to tell the Court that Mr. Smith was on the
"medication that they have prescribed" and asked that a trial date be set. Id. Thus, Mr. Smith is
correct that he never had a competency hearing, nor was Mr. Smith's fitness to proceed
"determined by the court," as required by I.C. § 18-212(1).
Prior to the criminal trial, Mr. Smith told the court that Mr. Byington "wants me to get on
medication and take - to take medication, because he feels maybe I'm aggressive or mad." T
(No. 35316) (October 15, 2007) pg. 88, In. 23-25. Mr. Smith also told the court that he had been
prescribed Celexa and Trazodone. Id, pg. 91, In. 24 - pg. 92, In. 2. On October 29, 2007, two
days before the start of trial, defense counsel told that court that he "was advised last week that
the jail had taken [Mr. Smith] off one of his medications," but "as of Friday, they would have 3•
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they were going to put him back on the medication." He also told the court "we are prepared to
go to trial, but he needs to be on his medication." Id., pg. 99, ln. 5 - pg. 100, ln. 10. During the
trial, defense counsel said that it was his "understanding [was] that the jail has agreed to put him
back on medications that was prescribed." T (No, 35316) (October 31, 2007). However, no
psychologist or psychiatrist was ever asked to reexamine Mr. Smith to determine what effect, if
any, the medication was having. So, even if Mr. Smith was taking the indicated medication,
there is no evidence in the record that the medications had restored his competence at the time of
trial.
The district court did note during trial that it had not noticed anything inappropriate with
Mr. Smith's interactions with his attorney. Id, pg. 349, ln. 3-17. However, the court noted that it
had observed Mr. Smith "very vigorously" participating in his defense, "frequently talking with
counsel ... giving instructions to counsel [and] passing notes to counsel. And again, lots of
communication." Id, pg. 349, ln. 3-17. Thus, none of the court's observations foreclose the
possibility that Mr. Smith was not competent as the basis of his lack of competency was his
tendency to get "off target," and act "fairly irrational, bizarre, and grandiose" as was noted by Dr.
Smith. Competency Report, pg. 8 (in PSI). To the contrary, the type of intrusive communication
between client and attorney observed by the district court suggests Mr. Smith was manifesting
the behavior which rendered him incompetent.
3.

The 2012 new trial motion

In support of his January 19, 2012 motion for new trial, Mr. Smith provided a long
statement of his history of serious and severe mental illness and incapacity. R No. #39704, pg.
2-17. Noting that Mr. Smith had filed at least five prior motions for a new trial, the court denied
4•
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the January 19 motion on the basis that it was untimely and the court lacked jurisdiction to hear
it. R No. #39704, pg. 23-24.
An appeal timely followed. R No. #39704, 26-29.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court on March 28, 2013, holding that the time
to file a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence may not be filed beyond
the two-year limitation. State v. Smith, 154 Idaho 581,300 P.3d 1069 (Ct. App. 2013).
4.

The current new trial motion

While the appeal in No. #39709 was pending, Mr. Smith filed another prose motion for a
new trial in the district court. CR 6. Mr. Smith again alleged that the district court had failed to

sua sponte order a competency evaluation and "failed to ascertain whether or not the defendant
was competent to proceed to trial." Id He also argued that "under§ 18-210, Defendant[']s
statutory time limit is tolled pending an evaluation to determine the Defendant's competency to
stand trial." CR 6.
In his memorandum of law filed with the motion, Mr. Smith argued that "the district
court's allowance of the case to be proved while Defendant was still mentally ill violated
statutes, laws and the Constitution of the state ofldaho." CR 8. Further, "the statute [LC.§ 1821 OJ requires that because the conviction was entered while Defendant was mentally incompetent
that the time for final judgment be tolled pending a psychiatric examination." CR 9. "Since the
defendant cannot be convicted while incompetence endures, [h]e/she shall be entitled to statutory
tolling pending medical evidence to show that the defendant is competent to proceed." CR 16.
Mr. Smith also alerted the district court to United States Supreme Court case law which
held that the one year statute of limitations for filing a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus
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may be equitably tolled. CR 16, citing Holland v. Florida, -

U.S.-, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560

(2010) ("[W]e hold that [28 U.S.C. ]§ 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate
cases.") In this argument, Mr. Smith says that Holland stands for the proposition that "a
defendant is entitled to statutory tolling of the statute of limitations," id, but it appears that he has
confused statutory tolling of the time in which to file a pleading, i.e., a tolling provision which is
found in statutory law, with equitable tolling, i.e., a tolling provision created by case law to
provide relief under extraordinary circumstances.
Along with the Motion for New Trial and the memorandum in support, Mr. Smith filed a
Motion to Request the Court Take Judicial Notice of the record in the case. He also filed a
Motion for Appointment of Counsel. Aug. CR. 2 The court then issued an Order RE Motion for
New Trial stating that "[i]t appears to this Court that the Court is without jurisdiction to hear any
of these matters because a final judgment was entered more than two years ago," and noting that
I.C.R. 34 does not permit a new trial motion to be made for any reason more than two years after
final judgment. It then ordered the parties to file a brief concerning the sole issue of whether the
court has jurisdiction to rule on Mr. Smith's motions. Aug. CR (Order, pg. 1-2).
The court's order for briefing on the statute oflimitations issue was filed on March 27,
2013, one day before this Court issued its opinion in No. 39704. State v. Smith, 154 ldaho 581,
300 P.3d 1069 (Ct. App. March 28, 2013). In No. 39704, the Court found that Mr. Smith's new
trial motion was untimely and rejected his argument that the language of J.C. § 19-2407-that a
motion must be filed within the time provided by the rules "unless the court or judge extends the

On July 3, 2013, the Court granted Mr. Smith's Motion to Augment the Record. The
file-stamped documents attached to that motion are cited herein as "Aug. CR."
2
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time"-permits a court to extend the two-year period. The Court wrote, "[t]he section 19-2407
contemplation of a possible extension of time by the court has no application in this case because
the Idaho Criminal Rules do not permit a court to authorize such an extension." State v. Smith,
154 Idaho at 582,300 P.3d at 1070. Most pertinent to this appeal, the Court of Appeals wrote in
a footnote: "Notably, Smith does not contend that his motion for a new trial was based upon
evidence that was not discovered until after the two-year period had expired, or that he was
prevented from timely filing his motion by action of the State, or that the time limit of !.C.R. 34
is unconstitutional in its application to his case." Id, n. 3. 3
In the present case, perhaps taking the hint from the Court of Appeals's footnote, Mr.
Smith argued, in response to the Court's order for briefing, that "I.C.R. 34 is unconstitutional and
that the Idaho Statute 19-2406 does not provide a procedural mechanism for this particular case
were [sic - where] the statute violates both LC. and Idaho Constitution." Aug. CR (Response to
Court's Order, pg. 1). In particular, he argued that "the application of !.C.R. 34 is
unconstitutional in its application in this case." Aug. CR (Memorandum of Law in Support of
Response to Court Order, pg. 4). "The I.C.R. 34 has no procedural mechanism to address a
clearly invalid conviction, which would address the nature of malfeasance of the court. It's
[c]lear that the statute in this case is unconstitutional on the grounds of due process and the equal
protections of the law." Aug. CR (Memo., pg. 10). (This was filed on April 9, 2013, less than
two weeks after the issuance of the opinion in No. 39704.)

3

It is no surprise that these arguments were not made on appeal because they were not

made below, see CR No. 39704, and the fundamental error doctrine does not apply to postconviction proceedings. Person v. State, 147 Idaho 453,455,210 P.3d 561,563 (Ct. App. 2009).
So the point of the Court's footnote is unclear, unless it was to suggest that Mr. Smith take a new
tack.
7•
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The state's response to the court's briefing order was to merely note the Court of
Appeals's opinion in No. 39704 and argue that "the decision from the Court of Appeals affirming
this Court's prior denial of this defendant's motion for a new trial in this very case is on point,
and the motion is untimely and should be denied." Aug. CR (State's Response, pg. 2). The state
did not address Mr. Smith's new constitutional issues.
The court did not discuss Mr. Smith's constitutional arguments either. Instead, it only
stated that it "knows of no rule, statute, or case law that would give the Court jurisdiction to hear
any of these matters and the parties have cited to none." CR 50. It continued: "Defendant's
motion for new trial is frivolous and he is not entitled to the appointment of counsel." With that,
the court denied all of Mr. Smith's motions. Id.
A timely notice of appeal was filed. CR 52.
5.

The Court of Appeals opinion

On appeal, Mr. Smith argued that the district court erred in denying Mr. Smith's motion
for appointment of counsel in light of the non-frivolous constitutional tolling argument made by
him. After reviewing the facts and procedural history of the case, the Court of Appeals
concluded:
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the district court did not err in
denying Smith's motion. The record demonstrates that Smith did receive a
psychiatric evaluation, as ordered by the district court, pursuant to LC. § 18-211,
and was found competent to proceed to trial once provided with medication.
Smith did not object to proceeding to trial when he was without one of his
medications and did not request a continuance at that time. Further, Smith failed
to raise the issue of his competency on his direct appeal and in his initial postconviction proceedings. He also did not raise the issue in his first five motions for
a new trial. When Smith eventually raised the issue of his competency in his sixth
motion for a new trial, the Rule 34 time limit has lapsed and the district court no
longer had jurisdiction to rule on the motion. Smith's seventh motion for a new
8•
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trial does not raise a new issue, but only contains a new argument for why his
untimely motion should not be subject to the Rule 34 bar. This argument could
have been raised in his sixth motion for a new trial, but Smith failed to raise it at
that time. Therefore, Smith is precluded from raising this claim as he already
raised the claim in his sixth motion and this Court concluded that the district court
properly denied the motion on the lack of jurisdiction. Additionally, Smith had
the ability to raise the issue in his direct appeal or in his initial post-conviction
petition but failed to do so.

State v. Smith, No. 40947 (2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 353), pg. 5-6 (citations and
parenthetical comments omitted). A copy of the Court of Appeals opinion is attached hereto as
Exhibit A.
C.

Issues Presented for Review
1. Did the Court of Appeals materially misstate/misunderstand the record from the

criminal case?
2. Did the district court err in not appointing counsel for Mr. Smith?

D.

Argument
1.

The Court of Appeals Materially Misstated/Misunderstands the Record

This Court should accept review under its supervisory authority because the Court of
Appeals has sanctioned the district court's substantial departure from the usual and accepted
course of judicial proceedings. I.A.R. 118(b)(4). In particular, the Court of Appeals asserted that
the district court found Mr. Smith to be competent after it ordered an LC. § 18-211 evaluation,
which found Mr. Smith to not be competent. However, the district court never made a
competency finding yet allowed Mr. Smith to proceed to trial.
The Court of Appeals is incorrect when it writes that "[t]he record demonstrates that Smith
did receive a psychiatric evaluation, as ordered by the district court, pursuant to LC. § 18-211, and

9•
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was found competent to proceed to trial once provided with medication." Exhibit A, pg 5. To
begin, the court appointed evaluator, Dr. Richard V. Smith, was a Ph.D. psychologist, not an M.D.
psychiatrist, so he could not have conducted a psychiatric evaluation. In addition, Dr. Smith said
that Mr. Smith was currently not competent but might be rendered competent if placed on
medication, Smith Report, pg. 8 (in PSI) ("[O]nce those medications would become effective
then he could in all likelihood proceed with the matters in court that he is currently facing.").
Finally, while Mr. Smith told the district court that he had been prescribed Celexa and Trazodone,
T (No. 35216) pg. 91, In. 24 - pg. 92, In. 2, neither Dr. Smith nor any other professional ever
determined what effect, if any, those medications were having. In short, Mr. Smith never had a
psychiatric evaluation or even a competency hearing after his psychological evaluation, nor was
Mr. Smith's fitness to proceed ever "determined by the court," as required by I.C. § 18-212(1).
The fact that trial counsel did not "object to proceeding to trial when [Mr. Smith] was
without one of his medications and did not request a continuance at that time," Exhibit A, pg. 5,
does not mean Mr. Smith was competent to proceed as the Court of Appeals suggests. At most, it
only shows that defense counsel wanted to go to trial as scheduled. Trial counsel could have
wanted to go to trial even though he believed Mr. Smith to be incompetent because he believed
that Mr. Smith being found incompetent and forced into treatment to restore his competency
would be a worse fate for his client than being found guilty and sent to jail. Or counsel might
have believed Mr. Smith to be competent, but that is not an opinion worthy of deference and
further did not relieve the court of its duly to determine whether Mr. Smith had been restored to
competency by the medication. See State v. Fuchs, 100 Idaho 341,346,597 P.2d 227,232 (1979)
("[W]hen the sanity issue has been raised the judge must conduct a hearing to inquire as to the
10 •
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defendant's capacity before accepting a guilty plea.") citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375
(1966). "When a defendant's fitness to proceed is in question, the issue shall be determined by
the trial court." State v. Daniel, 127 Idaho 801, 802-03, 907 P.2d 119, 120-21 (Ct. App. 1995)
(emphasis added). That never happened in Mr. Smith's case.
Accordingly, review should be granted because the Court of Appeals has misstated the
record in this case and has sanctioned the district court's trial of Mr. Smith after he had been
determined to be incompetent by Dr. Smith.
2.

The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Smith's Motion for Appointment of
Counsel

A needy person has the right to be represented by counsel in any post-commitment
proceeding that the needy person considers appropriate, "unless the court in which the proceeding
is brought determines that it is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means
would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous proceeding." LC. §
19-852(b)(3); see also State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 523-24, 873 P.2d 167, 168-69 (Ct. App.
1994). According to the Supreme Court:
When applying that standard to pro se applications for appointment of counsel, the
trial court should keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a pro se
petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete. Although facts sufficient to
state a claim may not be alleged because they do not exist, they also may not be
alleged because the pro se petitioner simply does not know what are the essential
elements of a claim.

Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). The decision to appoint
counsel in a post-judgment proceeding lies within the discretion of the district court. Thus, on
appeal, the decision whether to appoint counsel is reviewed under the abuse of discretion
standard. See Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999).
11 •
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Here, the district court found the proceeding was untimely and therefore frivolous. It
abused its discretion in so concluding because it did not even consider Mr. Smith's constitutional
argument which this Court in No. 39704 specifically noted was not before it. State v. Smith, 154
Idaho at 582, n.3, 300 P.3d at 1070, n. 3. Had the district court considered the new constitutional
issue, it would have appointed Mr. Smith counsel to present that argument and to support the
argument with affidavits and supporting documents.
Mr. Smith argued that the application of the I.C.R. 34 time limit violated his due process
and equal protection rights. He is correct. Access to courts has been called a "fundamental right."

Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 191, 30 P.3d 967,969 (2001); see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817, 827 (1977); and also Coleman v. State, 114 Idaho 901, 762 P.2d 814 (1988). While Article
1, Section 18 of the Idaho Constitution states that "Courts of justice shall be open to every
person," the right of access to the courts has been grounded in the Due Process Clauses of the
Idaho and United States Constitutions. Id.; see Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530,535,944 P.2d
127, 132 (1997); see also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11 n. 6 (1989). Due process affords
prisoners "a limited right of access to the courts, to challenge their convictions or their
confinement and to pursue actions for violations of their civil rights." State, Bureau of Child

Support Services v. Garcia, 132 Idaho 505,510,975 P.2d 793, 798 (Ct. App. 1999) citing
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821.
Inmate access to the courts must be "adequate, effective, and meaningful." Bounds, supra.
To this end, indigent prisoners must be allowed to file appeals and habeas corpus petitions without
payment of docket fees, Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257, (1959); states must provide trial records
to inmates unable to buy them, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956); and counsel must be

12 •
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appointed to give indigent inmates "a meaningful appeal" from their convictions. Douglas v.

California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963). The right of access ensures that a pleading challenging the
legitimacy of state custody will reach a court for its consideration. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho
at 191.
Mental disease and/or psychotropic medication which prevented the petitioner from timely
pursuing challenges to the conviction have been recognized as bases for equitable tolling in Idaho
in the post-conviction context. Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381, 385, 924 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Ct. App.
1996). This is consistent with the general rule in the United States. See Brian R. Means,
"Equitable tolling-Extraordinary circumstances-Mental and physical disabilities of the
petitioner," Postconviction Remedies § 25 :45 (Database updated July 2013). In Abbott, "the
applicant alleged that he was mentally incompetent during the criminal proceedings and that
following his sentencing he was kept under the influence of psychotropic medication which kept
him mentally incapacitated. His response to the State's motion to dismiss alleges that he was only
recently taken off of these drugs." The Court noted that "[t]hese allegations were not disproved by
the State." It concluded that:
Abbott's assertion that mental disease or psychotropic medication rendered him
incompetent and prevented him from earlier pursuing challenges to his conviction
are sufficient to raise factual issues and intertwining legal issues as to whether he
was prevented from timely filing his action by mental incapacity or medication,
whether strict application of the one-year statute of limitation would deprive Abbott
of any meaningful opportunity to present his claims for post-conviction relief, and
whether the statute of limitation should be deemed tolled in such circumstance to
avoid violation of constitutional due process guarantees .... Because these factual
and legal issues were not recognized or addressed in the proceedings below, we
decline to affirm the determination that Abbott's claim is barred by the statute of
limitation.

Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho at 385, 924 P.2d at 1229 (internal citations omitted).
13 •
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The Court in Chico-Rodriguez v. State, 141 Idaho 579,582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. App.
2005), clarified Abbott:
It is not enough to show that compliance was simply made more difficult on
account of a mental condition. We hold that in order for the statute of limitation
under the UPCP A to be tolled on account of a mental illness, an unrepresented
petitioner must show that he suffered from a serious mental illness which rendered
him incompetent to understand his legal right to bring an action within a year or
otherwise rendered him incapable of taking necessary steps to pursue that right.
Equitable tolling will apply only during the period in which the petitioner's mental
illness actually prevented him from filing a post-conviction action; any period
following conviction during which the petitioner fails to meet the equitable tolling
criteria will count toward the limitation period.
Id.

Thus, if Mr. Smith could demonstrate that his mental illness prevented him from timely
filing his claim, he could show the strict application of the Rule 34 time limits were violative of
due process. This is not a frivolous claim. However, it was not considered when the court denied
the motion for appointment of counsel. This was an abuse of discretion under the Sun Valley
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991), test because

(1) the trial court did not correctly perceive the issue as one of discretion, instead it felt compelled
to deny the motion by its conclusion that it had no jurisdiction; (2) the trial court failed to act
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it because the
constitutional argument was not frivolous; and (3) the trial court did not reach its decision by an
exercise of reason because it never considered the tolling argument.
The denial of the motion for appointment of counsel cannot be justified by the fact that the
court believed it did not have jurisdiction to consider the motion for a new trial. Mr. Smith's
argument was that his motion was timely because the time to file must be tolled in order to comply
with constitutional requirements. And as the Court of Appeals has said, "It is fair to say, of course,
14 •
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that a court has jurisdiction to determine whether it possesses jurisdiction." State v. Peterson, 148
Idaho 610,614,226 P.3d 552,556 (Ct. App. 2010) citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622,628
(2002); and Cedano-Viera v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9 th Cir. 2003). Without the
assistance of counsel, however, Mr. Smith was not able to develop the record needed to establish
his constitutional claim about why the district court had jurisdiction to rule on the new trial motion.
Accordingly, the Court should vacate the order denying the Motion for New Trial and reverse the
order denying the Motion for Appointment of Counsel and remand for further proceedings. See

Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788, 790, 992 P.2d 783, 785 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Because Anderson
was not allowed to present evidence in support of his claim that the limitation period should be
tolled, we reverse.").

E.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should accept review. The district court abused

its discretion in denying Mr. Smith's Motion for Appointment of Counsel and that order should be
reversed. Mr. Smith also asks this Court to vacate the order denying the new trial motion and
remand with instructions for further proceedings to allow Mr. Smith to develop the facts needed to
fully present his constitutional challenge to the I.C.R. 34 time limit as applied in this case.
1
Respectfully submitted this~' ~'r April, 2014.

Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Dana Smith
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on Apriffi, 2014, I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing
document to be:
-!:\-mailed
hand delivered
faxed
to:

Kenneth K. Jorgensen
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 40947
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
DANA L YD ELL SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

________________

2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 353
Filed: February 7, 2014
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
OPINION AND SHALL NOT
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Minidoka County. Hon. Michael R. Crabtree, District Judge.
Order denying motion for a new trial and denying motion for appointment of
counsel, affirmed.
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP; Dennis Benjamin, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
GRATTON, Judge
Dana Lydell Smith appeals from the district court's order denying his motion for a new
trial. Specifically, Smith challenges the district court's denial of his request for appointment of
counsel. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Smith was convicted by a jury of grand theft and the district court imposed a unified term
of fourteen years with seven years determinate. Smith's conviction and sentence were affirmed
by this Court in State v. Smith, Docket No. 35216 (Ct. App. May 20, 2009) (unpublished). The
remittitur was issued on June 17, 2009.

EXHfBIT-A

Thereafter, Smith filed several motions for a new trial, all of which the district court
denied. He also filed a motion for a Faretta 1 hearing and a motion to alter or amend judgment.
The district court denied the motions and this Court affirmed in State v. Smith, Docket No. 38197
(Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2011) (unpublished).
On January 19, 2012, Smith filed his sixth motion for a new trial claiming he was
mentally incompetent during his trial and the district court erred in failing to sua sponte order a
competency evaluation. The district court denied the motion on the grounds it was untimely and
the court had no jurisdiction to consider it. This Court affirmed the district court's order denying
Smith's motion for a new trial in State v. Smith, 154 Idaho 581,300 P.3d 1069 (Ct. App. 2013).
On March 11, 2013, while Smith's appeal was pending, Smith filed his seventh motion
for a new trial alleging error based on the district court's failure to sua sponte order a psychiatric
examination. Smith also filed a motion for appointment of counsel. The district court concluded
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Smith's motion for a new trial and therefore, Smith's motion
was frivolous. Thus, the court denied Smith's motion for appointment of counsel and denied his
motion for a new trial. Thereafter, Smith filed a response to the court's order claiming that Idaho
Criminal Rule 34, which established the time limit to file a motion for a new trial, was
unconstitutional and should not be applied in his case. Specifically, Smith claimed that he was
tried and convicted without a competency hearing in violation of Idaho Code § 18-210;
therefore, it would be unconstitutional to enforce the Rule 34 time limits when he was wrongly
convicted.

Additionally, he claimed that Rule 34 was unconstitutional because it had "no

procedural mechanism to address a clearly invalid conviction." The district court issued another
order denying Smith's motion for appointment of counsel and motion for a new trial on the basis
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the motions. Smith timely appeals.
II.

ANALYSIS

Smith claims that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for
appointment of counsel. A criminal defendant is entitled to counsel at all stages of a criminal
case unless a court determines the proceeding is not one that a reasonable person with adequate
means would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous

Farella v. California, 422 U.S. 806 ( 1975).
2

proceeding. LC.§ 19-852(b)(3). See also State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 523-24, 873 P.2d 167,
168-69 (Ct. App. 1994). The decision to appoint counsel in a post-judgment proceeding lies
within the discretion of the district court. LC. § 19-852(b)(3). Thus, on appeal, we apply an
abuse of discretion standard. See Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 683-84, 978 P .2d 241, 243-44
(Ct. App. 1999). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate
court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine:

(1) whether the lower court correctly

perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries
of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices
before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v.

Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). Whether a trial court properly applied
a statutory provision to the facts of a particular case is a question oflaw over which we exercise
free review. State v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 850, 865 P.2d 176, 177 (Ct. App. 1993).
On a defendant's motion in a criminal case, the trial court may grant a new trial in the
interest of justice. LC.R. 34. Idaho Code § 19-2406 specifies seven permissible grounds for a
new trial, including a demonstration that there exists new evidence material to the defense that
could not have been produced at the trial with reasonable diligence. LC. § 19-2406(7). Pursuant
to LC. § 19-2407, the "application for a new trial may be made before or after judgment; and
must be made within the time provided by the Idaho criminal rules unless the court or judge
extends the time." The time provided by the criminal rules varies depending on the grounds for
the motion. Rule 34 provides:
A motion for a new trial based upon the ground of newly discovered evidence
may be made only before or within two (2) years after final judgment. A motion
for a new trial based on any other ground may be made at any time within
fourteen (14) days after verdict, finding of guilt or imposition of sentence, or
within such further time as the court may fix during the fourteen (14) day period.
A judgment becomes final at the expiration of time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on
appeal. State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003); State v. Peterson, 148
Idaho 610, 614, 226 P.3d 552, 556 (Ct. App. 2010). Absent a statute or rule extending its
jurisdiction, the trial court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once the
judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the
judgment on appeal. Jakoski, 139 Idaho at 355, 79 P.3d at 714.
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On appeal, Smith claims that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
motion for appointment of counsel because he raised a non-frivolous claim regarding the
constitutionality of Rule 34. He contends that he could demonstrate that his mental competency
prevented him from timely filing his motion, therefore the strict application of the Rule 34 time
limits were violative of his due process rights. He alleges that without counsel, he was unable to
develop the record needed to establish his constitutional claim about why Rule 34 should not
have applied to his motion for a new trial.

Additionally, Smith suggests that the tolling

mechanisms available to post-conviction petitioners should be applicable to toll the Rule 34 time
limit to file his motion for a new trial.
The State claims that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Smith's motion for a
new trial, therefore the motion was frivolous and the court properly denied the appointment of
counsel. 2 Additionally, the State claims that even if equitable tolling were permitted in this
context, Smith is still unable to present a non-frivolous claim that his mental competency
prevented him from timely filing. To support this argument, the State points to the numerous
filings Smith made in the four-year time period since the remittitur was issued and also points to
the post-conviction petitions Smith filed as evidence of his ability to timely file his motion for a
new trial within the Rule 34 time limits.
We start by briefly discussing the history of Smith's competency claim.

Smith first

raised the issue of his competency prior to trial when he requested a continuance and argued that
he was mentally unfit to proceed to trial. After reviewing Smith's mental health evaluation, the
district court granted a continuance and ordered further psychiatric evaluations be performed,
pursuant to I.C. § 18-211, to determine Smith's ability to understand the proceedings against
him.

A psychiatric evaluation was performed and the evaluation indicated that Smith was

probably not competent to stand trial until he was prescribed medication. Smith was prescribed
Trazadone and Celexa and the trial date was scheduled. Prior to trial, the jail staff took Smith off
one of his medications which the jail staff concluded was only prescribed for sleeping. The
district court stated that the trial would continue as scheduled unless the psychiatrist determined

2

Smith notes that the district court had jurisdiction to consider whether it possessed
jurisdiction. See State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 610, 614, 226 P.3d 552, 556 (Ct. App. 2010) ("It is
fair to say, of course, that a court has jurisdiction to determine whether it possesses
j uri sdi cti on.").
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that the removal of the medication would affect Smith's competency. Smith did not object to the
court's ruling and did not request another continuance at that time. Thereafter, the psychiatrist
seemingly did not indicate the medication issue was a problem and Smith was tried and
convicted of grand theft.
Smith did not raise any issues relating to his competency in the direct appeal of his
conviction or in his initial petition for post-conviction relief. Smith's first five motions for a new
trial also did not raise any competency issues. 3 On February 18, 2011, Smith filed a successive
petition for post-conviction relief wherein he raised a competency-related issue in an attempt to
toll the statute of limitations for filing the petition. Specifically, he asserted that his mental
illness and his prescriptions for psychotropic medication provided sufficient reason for the
district court to consider his petition, though it was filed outside the one-year time limitation.
The district court rejected his argument, summarily dismissed the petition, and this Court
affirmed the district court's decision in Smith v. State, Docket No. 39705 (Ct. App. May 14,
2013) (unpublished).
On January 19, 2012, over two years after the remittitur from his direct appeal had been
issued, Smith filed a sixth motion for a new trial challenging whether the district court erred by
failing to order a psychiatric evaluation and failing to conduct a competency hearing.

The

district court denied the motion and Smith appealed. On appeal, this Court affirmed the district
court's order denying the motion, holding that the motion was untimely and the district court was
precluded from enlarging the time limitation to file the motion. See Smith, 154 Idaho at 583, 300
P .3d at 1071. Prior to this Court issuing that opinion, Smith filed a seventh motion for a new
trial (the motion at issue on this appeal) again alleging that the district court erred by failing to
order a psychiatric evaluation. This time, however, Smith added the claim that the application of
Rule 34 was unconstitutional. The district court denied the motion and Smith appealed.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Smith's
motion. The record demonstrates that Smith did receive a psychiatric evaluation, as ordered by
the district court, pursuant to LC. § 18-211, and was found competent to proceed to trial once
provided with medication. Smith did not object to proceeding to trial when he was without one
of his medications and did not request a continuance at that time. Further, Smith failed to raise
3

Smith's first five motions for a new trial raised cvidentiary issues and issues alleging the
ineffective assistance of counsel.
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the issue of his competency on his direct appeal and in his initial post-conviction proceedings.
He also did not raise the issue in his first five motions for a new trial. When Smith eventually
raised the issue of his competency in his sixth motion for a new trial, the Rule 34 time limit had
lapsed and the district court no longer had jurisdiction to rule on the motion. See Smith, 154
Idaho at 583, 300 P.3d at 1071. Smith's seventh motion for a new trial does not raise a new
issue, but only contains a new argument for why his untimely motion should not be subject to the
Rule 34 bar. This argument could have been raised in his sixth motion for a new trial, but Smith
failed to raise it at that time. Therefore, Smith is precluded from raising this claim as he already
raised the claim in his sixth motion for a new trial and this Court concluded that the district court
properly denied the motion based on the lack of jurisdiction. See Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144
Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613, 618 (2007) (discussing that claim preclusion bars subsequent
actions when the claim involves the same parties, same claim, and there is a final judgment).
Additionally, Smith had the ability to raise the issue in his direct appeal or in his initial postconviction petition but failed to do so.
Further, even if a tolling mechanism were applicable to the Rule 34 time limitations,
Smith would still be unable to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
request for appointment of counsel.

A criminal defendant is not entitled to counsel if the

proceeding is frivolous. LC. § 19-852(b)(3). See also Wade, 125 Idaho at 523-24, 873 P.2d at
168-69. Smith contends that appointed counsel would have been able to raise a non-frivolous
claim that the time limits imposed by Rule 34 were unconstitutional as applied to him. He
asserts that the time limits were unconstitutional as applied to him because Rule 34 contains no
mechanism in which to toll the time limitation.

However, even if the tolling mechanisms

established in post-conviction proceedings applied to Rule 34 motions, which we do not decide,
Smith's claim would still be frivolous because he does not meet the requirements for equitable
tolling. Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in post-conviction proceedings is "borne of
the petitioner's due process right to have a meaningful opportunity to present his or her claims."
Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 385-86, 256 P.3d 791, 793-94 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Leer v.
State, 148 Idaho 112, 115, 218 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Ct. App. 2009)). Therefore, in equitable tolling
circumstances, the petitioner's due process right is not violated by a statute of limitations bar
unless he can show: (1) that he was prevented from filing a timely claim; and (2) that he filed
the claim within a reasonable time once the event which prevented him from filing ceased.
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Schultz, 151 Idaho at 386, 256 P.3d at 794. See also Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904,
174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007); Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 25-26, 218 P.3d 1, 4-5 (Ct. App. 2009).
Thus, Smith would be required to show that he was unable to file his claim within the time limits
of Rule 34 and that once he became able to file his claim, he filed within a reasonable time.
Smith's motion for a new trial asserted that it was based on newly discovered evidence, which
Rule 34 requires to be brought within two years after final judgment. I.C.R. 34. However,
Smith's motion argued that the district court erred by failing to order a psychiatric evaluation and
failing to conduct a competency hearing. This argument does not consist of newly discovered
evidence. Thus, Smith was required to file his motion for a new trial within fourteen days of the
verdict or the imposition of his sentence pursuant to Rule 34. 4 Smith's verdict was filed on
November 6, 2007, and his sentence was imposed on March 31, 2008. Accordingly, the latest
Smith could have filed his motion for a new trial, based on the district court's failure to order a
psychiatric evaluation, was April 14, 2008.

Smith has provided no evidence that he was

prevented from filing his claim by that date. Contrarily, the record indicates that Smith had filed
three motions for a new trial prior to January 2008. Thus, Smith demonstrated the ability to
identify and file claims within the appropriate time period, but he failed to do so with regard to
his competency claim.
Additionally, the issue of whether Smith's mental status would allow a time limitation
to be tolled has already been adjudicated in Smith's successive petition for post-conviction relief.

In that case, this Court determined that Smith's petition was not entitled to equitable tolling,
stating:
Smith does not argue that his mental condition or his psychotropic medication
prevented him from raising his claims during his direct appeal or his initial postconviction petition. There is nothing in the record that shows that Smith was
unable to inform his prior counsel of the claims he wanted to address. Contrarily,
the record indicates that Smith filed his initial petition for post-conviction relief

4

Even if Smith's competency argument was construed as newly discovered evidence, he
would be unable to meet the two-year time limit established by Rule 34. The two-year period
wherein Smith could have filed a motion for a new trial, based on newly discovered evidence,
ran from June 17, 2009, to June 17, 2011. Thus, Smith would have to show that his
incompetency prevented him from filing claims during that time period. However, during that
time period, Smith filed his successive petition for post-conviction relief and his fifth motion for
a new trial. This demonstrates that Smith had the ability to identify and file his competency
claim during the two-year time period, but failed to do so.
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pro se, demonstrating his ability and mental acuity to understand his claims and
raise them. Accordingly, Smith's successive petition is not entitled to equitable
tolling. See Leer v. State, 148 Idaho 112,218 P.3d 1173 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding
that equitable tolling did not apply on the basis of mental incapacity when the
defendant demonstrated his mental acuity by timely filing a pro se motion for
appointment of post-conviction counsel).
Smith, Docket No. 39705. Therefore, Smith would be unable to show that his mental status
prevented him from timely filing a motion for a new trial on the basis of his competency.
Smith's motion for a new trial would not have been subject to equitable tolling and thus,
appointed counsel would be unable to develop a non-frivolous claim that the time limits imposed
by Rule 34 were unconstitutional as applied to Smith. Accordingly, the district court did not err
in denying Smith's request for appointment of counsel.
III.
CONCLUSION

Smith has failed to demonstrate reversible error. Therefore, the district court's order
denying Smith's motions for a new trial and appointment of counsel is affirmed.
Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge LANSING CONCUR.
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